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Once installed, such a regulation will endure, regardless of its demonstrated inefficiency, until the regulated activity becomes irrelevant or obsolete because of exogenous changes in demand or production technology.
In October 1987, when I was the young and earnest deputy general counsel of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), a question concerning an obscure regulation landed on my desk. Still on the books was a statutory mandate-section 353(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended in 1937, 2 which expanded legislation first enacted in 1912 in response to the sinking of the Titanic-that required that any U.S. cargo ship with a radiotelegraph auto alarm also carry a radiotelegraph operator possessing six months of experience acquired aboard a U.S. ship. 3 The FCC in 1981 began to interpret section 353(b)'s six-month experience requirement so as to exclude a radiotelegraph operator's experience acquired onboard a U.S. Navy or Coast Guard ship, because U.S. government ships were typically not equipped with
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completed." 16 However, the 1912 legislation did not expressly mandate that a ship carry a radiotelegraph station or that it carry a radio operator (full-time or otherwise). Curiously, the legislation required only that a shipboard radio station be capable of sending (and not sending and receiving) distress signals, and that a licensed person operate any radio apparatus. 17 Consequently, any ship that had a radio apparatus needed to have a licensed person operate it. 18 However, the text of the Radio Act of 1912 did not itself require ships to have a radio apparatus, and ships without a radio apparatus (which might have been few) were not required to have a licensed operator.
Fifteen years later, Congress increased the federal government's regulation of radio communications through the enactment of the Radio Act of 1927, which, among other things, created the Federal Radio Commission (FRC), an agency within the Department of Commerce (and the predecessor of the FCC). 19 Like the Radio Act of 1912, the 1927 legislation required that "[e]very radio station on shipboard . . . be equipped to transmit radio communications or signals of distress . . . with apparatus capable of transmitting and receiving messages over a distance of at least one hundred miles by day or night." 20 Another similarity to the Radio Act of 1912 was that the 1927 legislation required that " [t] he actual operation of all transmitting apparatus in any radio station for which a station license is required by this Act shall be carried on only by a person holding an operator's license issued hereunder."
21 By implication, only a licensed radio operator onboard a ship would be permitted to operate the transmitting equipment. Therefore, every ship so equipped to send distress messages needed a licensed operator onboard. Paradoxically (but like the Radio Act of 1912), what the 1927 legislation did not appear anywhere to have required is that every ship have a radio station that could transmit a distress signal.
The Communications Act of 1934 replaced the FRC with the FCC, 22 but the new legislation retained the preexisting statutory requirements of the 1927 legislation, including this requirement concerning radio stations aboard U.S. ships. 23 In addition, section 322 of the 1934 legislation mandated interoperability between any land radio station and any ship radio station. 24 that radio stations onboard ships be equipped to "transmit radio communications or signals of distress on the frequency specified by the Commission, with apparatus capable of transmitting and receiving messages over a distance of at least one hundred miles by day or night." 25 However, ships still were not required to have a radio apparatus. Once again, although ships that did have a radio apparatus also had to have a licensed operator, 26 nothing in the text of the Communications Act of 1934 required ships without a radio apparatus to have a licensed operator.
It is striking that Congress, in its three major initiatives to regulate maritime radiotelegraphy after the sinking of the Titanic, did not find it necessary to mandate that all ships have a radio apparatus. Perhaps the absence of such a command simply reflected common sense: no ship owner needed to be compelled by force of law to take the incremental step of increasing the protection of life at sea by having a radio station onboard. Or perhaps some other statute (regulating maritime safety as opposed to radio communications) independently imposed a duty on a ship owner to include a radio station on his ship.
B. The Enactment of Section 353(b) in 1937
In May 1937-25 years after the Titanic sank-Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 to add provisions concerning radiotelegraphy standards. 27 One amendment made it unlawful for the first time as a matter of U.S. communications law "[f]or any ship of the United States . . . to be navigated in the open sea . . . unless such ship is equipped with an efficient radio installation in operating condition, in charge of and operated by a qualified radio operator or operators." 28 Another amendment required that every ship fitted with a radio installation (with some exceptions) carry at least two qualified radio operators. 29 The ostensible purpose of this provision was to ensure that a single radio officer need not keep watch over the radiotelegraph station for all twenty-four hours of the day (which, of course, would have been physically impossible).
By 1937, automatic alarms were commercially available that enabled a ship's crew to receive a distress signal sent by radiotelegraph even when the radio operator was away from his station. In August 1937, the Radio Congress added section 353(b) to the Communications Act in May 1937 to permit cargo ships equipped with a radiotelegraph auto alarm to carry a single radio officer instead of the two-officer minimum imposed on other ships. 31 If a ship needed only one radio operator, section 353(b) required that that operator have "at least six months' previous service in the aggregate as a qualified operator in a station on board a ship or ships of the United States." 32 In contrast, the Communications Act, as amended in 1937, did not require six-months of experience for radio operators on ships lacking an auto alarm. That is, when a ship was obliged to carry at least two qualified radio operators, neither operator needed six months of experience acquired as an operator aboard a U.S. ship or ships.
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Perhaps Congress added section 353(b) to the Communications Act at the behest of labor unions. Mervyn Rathborne, the president of the American Radio Telegraphists' Association, a labor union of radio operators, 34 advo- cated the six-month experience requirement before the Senate Commerce Committee. 35 With some revisions, Congress enacted Rathborne's recommendation. 36 Rathborne claimed that the six-month experience requirement would guarantee that the radio operator would be competent aboard a ship.
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If lives depended on a radio operator, he argued, that radio operator needed to have experience at sea, and not merely a second-class radiotelegraph operator's license. "Many of these men," he said, "are not capable of operating a ship radio station when they receive their licenses [because] . . . . they have not had an opportunity to be aboard ship; they do not know how a ship operates or functions; and they frequently get themselves into considerable trouble through their lack of knowledge of life aboard ship." 39 The U.S. Navy completely controlled radio during the war. After World War I, the Navy was instrumental in creating RCA as America's national champion of radio technology. 40 The Navy went so far as to write into RCA's corporate charter the provision that at least one Navy officer would sit "by invitation" on the board of directors. 41 Thus, RCA would have had an incentive to lobby Congress to encourage shipowners to fit their ships with an auto alarm. Although section 353 did not explicitly require shipowners to fit their ships with an auto alarm, it is likely that section 353 encouraged shipowners to do so, because section 353 stipulated that shipowners could either fit their ships with an auto alarm and employ only one radio operator or decline to fit their ships with an auto alarm and instead employ two radio operators. Assuming that both of those options made equal contributions to maritime safety, it was likely the case that the first option-equipping a ship with an auto alarm and employing only one radio operator-was the lower-cost option that shipowners would have chosen to maximize profits.
Curiously, RCA did not testify at the congressional hearings for the 1937 amendments to the Communications Act. The company's conspicuous absence was like the dog that did not bark in the night. 42 RCA had much to gain from lobbying Congress to enact section 353 (and Congress would surely have welcomed RCA's input on legislation seeking to improve maritime safety through radio communications). Moreover, only three months after Congress enacted the 1937 legislation, RCA had advertisements in Life magazine (whose readership likely consisted of civilians who were not in need of a radio auto alarm), which touted its more than seven hundred existing orders for its radio alarm and predicted that all ships would eventually have this equipment.
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C. The Proposed Repeal of Section 353(b) in 1938
After having amended the Communications Act in May 1937, Congress in March 1938 abruptly considered repealing section 353(b)'s new six-month experience requirement for radio operators. 44 The growing risk of war in Europe gave members of Congress reason to worry that an exogenous demand stimulus for U.S. cargo shipping to supply allies in such a war would increase the derived demand for radio telegraphers and make their presence onboard a binding constraint on the ability of U.S. ships to leave port. The proponents of repeal included the American Steamship Owners' Association, 45 the Pacific American Steamship Association, the Shipowner's Association of the Pacific Coast, and the Waterfront Employers' Association of San Francisco. 46 They argued that eliminating the six-month experience requirement would alleviate shortages for radio operators. Chairman Frank R. McNinch of the FCC foresaw "difficulties in the administering of the positive requirements of the existing law . . . when vessels are in locations where it is found impossible, except with considerable expense and loss of time, to obtain operators who have had the previous required service." 47 One steamship captain testified that "vessels of our American merchant marine travel to many ports wherein there would be no such supply of radio operators with 6 months' sea experience, and, in such an event, if a vessel proceeded to sea without a radio operator with this 6 months' experience, the ship is liable to a fine of $500 per day." 48 Proponents further argued that (1) the Telecommunications Treaty, which the United States signed at the Telecommunications Convention of 1932, did not require radio operators on board ships to have six months of experience at sea, and (2) the FCC's rules and regulations did not require radio operators to have experience at sea. 49 Consequently, proponents of repealing the six-month experience requirement questioned its necessity when neither the Telecommunications Convention nor the FCC had thought it necessary. 50 In 1938, the FCC also supported section 353(b)'s repeal. The FCC believed that it should be responsible for determining what experience should qualify a radio operator to serve aboard a ship, because, in the Frankurterian view of Chairman McNinch, the FCC could be flexible in "unusual and unforeseen situations." 51 In contrast, he believed, section 353(b), being a statute, was inflexible.
The opponents of repealing the six-month experience requirement included the American Radio Telegraphists' Association, the Labor's Nonpartisan League, the Inland Boatmen's Union of the Pacific, the Alaska Fishermen's Union, the Committee for Industrial Organization, the National Maritime Union of America, the Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association, and the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America. 53 They argued that "the repeal of section 353(b) would result in the endangering of life and property at sea."
54 At the 1938 congressional hearings, Rathborne actually urged Congress to make section 353(b) more constraining by mandating that U.S. cargo ships with an auto alarm carry a radio operator with a full year of experience.
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D. Amendments to Section 353(b) Between 1941 and 1965
The fight over repealing section 353(b) continued after the outbreak of World War II in Europe. On July 8, 1941, Congress amended section 353(b) to give the FCC the discretion to suspend or modify the six-month experience requirement "during the emergency proclaimed by the President on September 8, 1939, to exist, but not after June 30, 1943." 56 The FCC exercised this power of suspension, which drew opposition from labor groups that had supported the six-month experience requirement. One union leader said that "the only objective of this bill . . . [is] to create a vast surplus from which you can more readily select men who will be forced to take jobs that they [would] otherwise refuse." 57 Ultimately, the suspension of the six-month experience requirement from 1939 to 1943 was a political compromise, as Congress had considered instead giving the FCC the discretion, without any sunset provision, to determine the necessary qualifications for radio operators aboard U.S. ships. 58 In 1943, Congress modified the temporary suspension of the six-month experience requirement to empower the FCC to suspend or modify the In 1954, Congress exempted cargo ships of less than 1600 tons from the requirement that they be equipped with a radiotelegraph installation, 61 allowing those ships to be equipped with a radiotelephone installation instead. 62 Consequently, Congress revised section 353(b) to clarify that the requirement that ships with an auto alarm needed to carry at least one operator with at least six months of experience applied only to ships "required . . . to be fitted with a radiotelegraph installation" 63 -that is, if ships were equipped with a radiotelephone installation and not a radiotelegraph installation (cargo ships of less than 1600 tons), they were not required to carry a radio operator with at least six months of experience on board a ship or ships of the United States.
In 1965, to conform with the 1960 Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Congress tightened section 353(b) by requiring ships equipped with radio auto alarms to carry at least one "radio officer," as opposed to the prior requirement that those ships carry at least one "qualified operator." 64 For U.S. ships, Congress defined the term "radio officer" to mean "a person holding at least a first or second class radiotelegraph operator's license as prescribed and issued by the [Federal Communications] Commission." 65 That radio officer, when employed to operate a radiotelegraph station on a U.S. ship, was additionally required to have a U.S. Coast Guard radio officer license in accordance with other laws in effect at the time (and still in effect as of 2016). 66 The Coast Guard was and remains the agency responsible for licensing radio officers aboard U.S. ships. 67 As part of the 1965 amendments to section 353(b), Congress also replaced the words "radiotelegraph installation" with "radiotelegraph station" and "auto-alarm" with "radiotelegraph auto alarm." 
A. Was Section 353(b) Necessary for Safety Purposes?
Although section 353(b) might seem on its face to have been enacted for safety purposes, it bears emphasis that market forces already encouraged safety. 69 If an experienced radiotelegrapher aboard a cargo ship could have reduced the risk that the ship would be lost at sea, then each ship owner individually would have had a strong incentive to hire only a competent and experienced radiotelegrapher. This incentive existed because, among other reasons, insurance companies do not insure against 100 percent of the risk of loss (that is, because of the problem of moral hazard, insurance companies require a deductible) and because insurers charge experience-rated premiums and thus impose higher insurance costs on firms with inferior safety records.
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These higher liability costs for the ship owner either would have raised the price of and reduced the demand for his cargo services relative to those of safer competitors or, in a rate-regulated market, would simply have dissipated his profits.
Furthermore, ship owners collectively had an incentive to hire competent and experienced radiotelegraphers because no ship owner knows beforehand whether his ship might eventually be sending or receiving a distress signal at sea. 71 To be sure, there was some potential for free-riding on the receiving side: one ship owner might have tried to avoid (private) costs by hiring a less competent and less experienced radiotelegrapher and thus shifting to other shippers his own responsibility for being able to receive a radiotelegraph message from a ship in distress. Whether this problem ever manifested itself in the real world is questionable, because the probability that such behavior would be detected and the cost to the ship owner if it was detected were both significant. Even given the comparatively unsophisticated wireless communications technology of 1912, it was possible to ascertain the position of the Californian relative to the Titanic when it was sinking. Influencing the probability of detection was the fact that other partiessuch as insurance companies-had an incentive to check whether such shirking was occurring (just as they had an incentive to conduct boiler inspections) and to penalize (through higher insurance premiums or termination of coverage or refusal to pay claims) those insured who acted opportunistically or deceptively. In turn, two concerns affected the cost to the ship owner if he was caught shirking. First, such opportunism could have damaged a ship owner's reputation in the eyes of his customers, because it might signal that the ship owner was cutting corners elsewhere in a way that could increase the risk of loss for someone entrusting cargo to him (or to the insurer of the risk). Second, the master of a vessel had (and still has) the legal duty to "render assistance to any individual found at sea in danger of being lost."
72 This statutory duty supersedes the common-law rule that there is no duty to rescue. 73 A breach of this statutory duty to rescue at sea was (and still is) punishable by either a maximum fine of $1,000 or a maximum prison term of two years, or both.
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Perhaps the breach of this statutory duty would also give rise to private tort actions for loss of life or property. Therefore, it appears that the expected cost to the ship owner of engaging in such free riding would have been substantial and could have far exceeded the expected benefit from hiring a less competent and less experienced radiotelegrapher.
As long as the presence of a radiotelegrapher on a cargo ship continued, on the margin, to reduce the risk of losing one's ship at sea or to increase the likelihood of being able to rescue someone else's ship in distress, ship owners would have continued to have an incentive to demand competence and experience from radiotelegraphers. This incentive would have existed independently of how much experience Congress required radiotelegraphers to acquire before serving as the sole radiotelegrapher on a ship. 
B. Why Did Congress Implement Section 353(b)?
Given ship owners' economic incentives to hire qualified radiotelegraphers, it is worth asking why Congress still chose to regulate the labor market for radiotelegraphers by enacting section 353(b). The legislative history surrounding section 353(b) and the subsequent attempts to repeal its six-month experience requirement contain evidence suggesting that, in 1937, the requirement was a featherbedding provision designed to raise wages for radiotelegraphers, as opposed to a provision genuinely designed to enhance safety at sea. It appears that labor groups sought to erect a barrier to entry in the market for radio operators so as to earn economic rent. It was the president of a radiotelegraphers' union, Mervyn Rathborne, who proposed in a Senate hearing in 1937 that Congress enact section 353(b). 75 Indeed, in 1941 it was openly discussed that Congress enacted the six-month experience requirement to benefit radio operators. During the congressional hearings for section 353(b)'s suspension in 1941, Francis B. Walker, representing the American Merchant Marine Institute, testified that it was "common knowledge" that section 353(b)'s six-month experience requirement "was inserted only to satisfy certain associations of marine radiotelegraph operators." 
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. 78 When the sources underlying the dataset do not list any maritime disasters in a given year (such as 1922), the dataset will indicate that zero maritime deaths occurred that year. When those years are treated as having missing values, the trend that Figure I illustrates stays the same. I have also estimated a polynomial function for the trend in the number of deaths from maritime disasters not on government vessels. The equation of the estimated trendline is ŷ = 4.7768x 2 -218.37x + 2500.2. The dependent variable, ŷ, is the predicted number of maritime deaths given the trend in maritime deaths over the years. The independent variable, x, is a count of years, starting from a value of 1 in 1912. That is, in 1912, x is equal to 1. Similarly, in 1937, x is equal to 26. Although a literal reading of the trendline would indicate that deaths increase after 1934, that predicted increase is merely an artifact of the trendline being a quadratic function, with a minimum in 1934. I have also estimated a cubic function and a logarithmic function for the trend in the number of deaths from maritime disasters not on government vessels, but I have concluded that the quadratic function, relative to the two other functions, best predicts deaths per year, because the quadratic function has the highest adjusted R-squared for my dataset. I therefore present the 
Deaths from Maritime Disasters quadratic function, even through it indicates a nonexistent increase at the extreme upper end of the estimated time interval. As both the bar chart and the trendline demonstrate, deaths from maritime disasters not on government vessels were clearly declining from 1912 to 1937 (notwithstanding a spike in deaths in 1916, which occurred more than 20 years before 1937). It bears emphasis that Figure 1 reports an upper bound on the number of deaths from maritime disasters not on government ships reported for each year, because (1) Figure 1 includes deaths from maritime disasters that did not occur at sea-for example, maritime disasters that occurred in harbors, straits, rivers, and so forth-which means that section 353(b) would not have affected the ships involved in those disasters, 79 and (2) Figure 1 includes deaths from maritime disasters on non-U.S. ships that were not subject to U.S. regulation of radiotelegraphers. and that, during those six months, the radio officer hold a U.S. Coast Guard radio officer license. 86 The FCC's stringent interpretation of section 353(b) effectively excluded experience acquired aboard U.S. government ships from the experience that the agency counted toward fulfillment of the six-month experience requirement, because U.S. government vessels by the 1980s typically were no longer equipped for telegraph operation. 87 Naval vessels predominately used radioteletype communications. Even if U.S. government vessels were equipped with telegraph equipment, such equipment did not necessarily meet the FCC's requirements for private ships. Despite the expertise that one would expect the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard to possess in maritime communications, and although many radio operators on U.S. government vessels held first-or second-class radiotelegraph licenses, the FCC determined that the actual work performed by Navy and Coast Guard radio operators conferred too little of the particular type of experience that the FCC interpreted section 353(b) to require.
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Besides adding the radiotelegraph station requirement, the FCC also interpreted section 353(b) to require an applicant to hold, at the same time that he was accruing his six months of cognizable experience, a radio officer license issued by the Coast Guard pursuant to its statutory powers. 89 This requirement was in addition to a first-or second-class radiotelegraph license issued by the FCC and did not appear in the language of section 353(b).
B. The Economic Effects of the FCC' s 1981 Rule
As Figure 2 shows, the FCC issued 340 six-month service endorsements between fiscal years 1974 and 1987. 90 In 1987, the FCC granted only seven of 23 applications for the six-month endorsement. 91 The FCC did not retain records before 1987 from which to compute the percentage of applicants granted endorsements over time; but changes in the total number of endorsements granted anecdotally suggest that the FCC's 1981 interpretation introduced a period of substantially diminished entry into this labor market.
86 Definition of "Radio Officer," supra note 67, at 18,719. 87 See, e.g., id. at 18,719 n.5 ("The Commission recognizes that persons whose radiotelegraph experience has been limited to U.S. government vessels cannot meet these requirements as these vessels are not subject to the [ The FCC's 1981 rule came during a sharp decline in the number of U.S.-flag privately owned merchant vessels. That decline implies that a corresponding decline was occurring in the derived demand for radiotelegraph operators aboard such vessels. Figure 3 shows U.S. maritime employment (a proxy for the number of radiotelegraphers) and the number of U.S.-flag privately owned merchant vessels, which included U.S. cargo ships that were required to comply with section 353(b). As Figure 3 shows, U.S. maritime employment and U.S.-flag privately owned merchant vessels have followed similar declining trends over time. Both data series exhibit a long-term pattern of decline since the 1940s and particularly after the 1960s. For simplicity, if one were to assume that the supply of shipping services was held constant, then this decline in U.S.-flag privately owned merchant vessels represents a decline in the demand for the services of those ships and, consequently, a decline in the derived demand for U.S. maritime employees (which included radiotelegraphers). That the decline occurred during a period when global shipping was increasing puts the trend in U.S.-flag shipping into even starker contrast to the prospects of the industry as a whole. By 1981, it should have been abundantly clear to the FCC that U.S. cargo shipping was in severe decline. One could argue that the reduction in six-month service endorsements issued by the FCC (evident in Figure 2) was because of the decline in the demand for U.S. cargo services and the consequent decline in the derived demand for radiotelegraphers aboard U.S. ships. Figure 3 confirms the plausibility of this explanation.
At the same time, the data are consistent with the hypothesis that the FCC in 1981 raised barriers to entry into this labor market. One datum supporting this interference was the $60,000 to $70,000 salary that holders of the six-month endorsement typically earned in 1987 on a six-month voyage-a salary substantially higher than that paid to radio officers lacking the endorsement. 93 In 2016 dollars, those salaries were equivalent to between $125,135 and $146,107 on an annualized basis. 94 To put the annual wage of an FCC-authorized radiotelegrapher in perspective, the median income in the United States in 1987 (converted to 2016 dollars) was $40,451.
95 An FCC-authorized radiotelegrapher was therefore earning between 3.1 and 3.6 times the median income in the United States in 1987.
That holders of the six-month endorsement had such a high salary relative to radio officers without the endorsement suggests that the FCC's 1981 ruling was responsible (at least in part) for the low number of endorsements for radiotelegraph officers. Furthermore, that there was a decrease in demand for U.S. cargo shipping-and, consequently, a decrease in the derived demand for radiotelegraphers aboard U.S. cargo ships-suggests that unions representing radiotelegraphers lobbied the FCC to interpret section 353(b) more stringently so as to elevate radiotelegraphers' wages during a period when market forces were actually suppressing those wages. This hypothesis-that the FCC's 1981 ruling worsened an anticompetitive barrier to entry that artificially raised the wages of endorsed radiotelegraphers-comports with the growing economic consensus that occupational licensing, which section 353(b) exemplifies, typically impedes entry and raises wages for licensed members of the profession in question. 96 The FCC's stringent interpretation of section 353(b) was exacerbating incumbent protection in the labor market. to interpret section 353(b) more stringently suggests that it was catering to unions representing radiotelegraphers. Why else would the FCC have chosen to tighten its interpretation of an obscure and obsolete regulation concerning a dying industry?
Further, as a consequence of the FCC's stringent interpretation of section 353(b), the agency was forced to engage in the laborious examination of ship logs to determine whether a given applicant had accrued the requisite number of hours of experience. The FCC required 1,440 hours of satisfactory experience to meet the six-month experience requirement in section 353(b). The FCC staff literally tallied individual hours, manually checking to see whether the hours that an applicant logged for a particular day should be excluded because, for example, the applicant spent the time repairing rather than using equipment, or the ship was not in the open sea, or more than one radio officer signed the log.
97 Assuming (very unrealistically) that an applicant logged eight satisfactory hours each day, the FCC would have needed to examine 180 separate daily records to rule on the suitability of an applicant's six months of experience.
It is elemental that government should not undertake a regulatory action unless its expected benefits to society exceed its expected costs to society. Consistent with the conclusion that section 353(b) on its face did not mandate any particular radiotelegraphy experience, the relevant public-interest question was this: did the additional regulatory hurdle that the FCC created in 1981 for the licensing of radiotelegraphers on U.S. cargo ships generate any marginal benefit in maritime safety and, if so, did the marginal benefit exceed the marginal cost that this additional hurdle imposed on consumers of maritime services and on communications workers who wished to enter this labor market? Because of technological advances in maritime communications and because of the incentive that ship owners had to hire competent radio officers even without section 353(b), the first part of this question was very likely to be answered in the negative. If so, then even a modest marginal cost imposed on consumers or communications workers as a result of the FCC's 1981 interpretation of section 353(b) would have outweighed the marginal benefit and thereby would have caused a net harm to the public interest. That outcome would have contravened the basic principle that government should choose regulatory objectives to maximize net benefits to society. Indeed, in 1987, the FCC was not aware of any empirical study that confirmed that its six-month endorsement rules had improved maritime safety. 98 It follows that the FCC was also bereft of evidence with which to estimate how much, if at all, a marginal relaxation of its interpretation of section 353(b) would have reduced maritime safety. In light of the explicit statement in section 353(b) that the six-month endorsement existed "for safety purposes," the FCC would have better discharged its public-interest responsibility in 1987 by reconsidering its interpretation and implementation of the statute.
C. Did the Language of Section 353(b) Compel the FCC' s 1981 Statutory
Interpretation?
The FCC's stringent interpretation of section 353(b) was legally dubious. On its face, section 353(b) did not exact onerous requirements on someone wishing to work as a radio officer on a U.S. cargo ship. It required only that, to work as a radio officer on a cargo ship, one must have had at least six months' experience as a radio officer on a U.S. ship. The meaning of these last two terms-radio officer and U.S. ship-was not in question in the 1980s. The Communications Act defined a radio officer on a ship of the United States as a person holding at least a first-or second-class radiotelegraph operator's license as prescribed and issued by the FCC, 99 in addition to having a U.S. Coast Guard radio officer license. 100 To qualify for a second-class radiotelegraph operator's license, one had to pass a written examination covering radiotelegraphy operating procedures and a Morse code examination (both receiving and transmitting) at 16 code groups per minute and 20 words per minute plain language, whereas a first-class license required passing Morse code examinations at 20 code groups per minute and 25 words per minute plain language.
101 Thus, to receive a radiotelegraph operator's certificate, one needed to demonstrate to the FCC an objective level of competency in sending and receiving Morse code.
The meaning of a U.S. ship also was not in question. Section 353(b) did not distinguish between U.S. government vessels and private U.S. vessels. Thus, Navy and Coast Guard ships constituted "ships of the United States" for purposes of this statute. To conclude the opposite would have required imparting an unnatural meaning to this phase.
The remaining legal question before the FCC in the late 1980s was whether six months as a radio operator on a Navy or Coast Guard ship was the kind of "previous service" that section 353(b) required. The statute did not expressly indicate what the radio officer was required to do to acquire six months of experience. In particular, the statute did not require that one's "previous service . . . as a radio officer" be performed in a radiotelegraph station.
102 Therefore, the FCC in 1987 quite reasonably could have applied the plain language of section 353(b) and allowed that, as long as a radio operator on a U.S. government vessel held a radiotelegraph license, any kind of experience a system of self-certification administered by ship owners and made under penalty of perjury.
The FCC released a report and order amending its regulation of radiotelegraph officer licensing on October 31, 1988, nine months after issuing notice that it would consider new rules. 108 These rules adopted most of the proposals in my 1987 memorandum. Beginning on December 15, 1988, service as a radio officer on U.S. government ships would qualify an individual for the six-month service endorsement. 109 The FCC revised its rules to require the applicant to show that he had worked for six months on board ships of the United States that were "equipped with a radio station complying with the provisions of Part II of Title III of the Communications Act or the ships were owned and operated by the U.S. government, for example the U.S. Navy or U.S. Coast Guard, and equipped with radio stations."
110 In addition, the radio officer's "time spent on board a ship performing maintenance duties, training, operating radiotelephone stations and time in port" qualified for the sixth-month service period, and the FCC's report and order "also propose[d] to allow vessel owners, operators, captains and masters to certify that the applicant ha [d] successfully completed the six months qualifying service requirements." 111 The FCC also made rule changes to allow applicants to qualify for the six-month service endorsement without having held a radio officer's license issued by the Coast Guard for the entire six-month employment period. The FCC amended section 13.12(2)(i) of its rules to require the applicant to have been employed as a "radio operator," instead of a "radio officer," as the agency had required before 1988. 112 Furthermore, the applicant no longer needed a radio officer license issued by the Coast Guard for the entire six-month period; the applicant needed only to hold the license "at the time the six-month service endorsement [was] requested." 113 The FCC also redefined a "radio eling in the open sea. 119 All of these "compulsory ships" had to be GMDSSequipped by February 1999. 120 Moreover, the GMDSS did not require ships to be equipped with manual Morse code telegraphy equipment, and the GMDSS required alternative means of sending distress alerts.
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In the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress finally clarified that the six-month experience requirement of section 353(b) did not apply to ships operating in accordance with the GMDSS requirements. 122 Congress removed section 353(b) as a binding constraint on ship owners when it provided that "a ship . . . operating in accordance with the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System provisions of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention shall not be required to be equipped with a radiotelegraphy station operated by one or more radio officers or operators."
123 Yet, Congress still did not repeal section 353(b), such that, between 1992 and 1996, GMDSS-equipped ships were still required to be equipped with a radiotelegraphy station and at least one radio officer, even though GMDSS-equipped ships had methods of communication that were superior to radiotelegraphy. Even in 2016, more than a century after the loss of the Titanic, section 353(b) remains in Title 47 of the U.S. Code.
Conclusion
Old regulations never die. After the sinking of the Titanic in 1912, Congress began regulating maritime radiotelegraphy. A full quarter century passed between the occurrence of the disaster and the enactment of the most conspicuous rent-seeking legislation, which Congress continued to justify on grounds of maritime safety. However, exogenous changes in the demand for U.S. cargo shipping and in the technology of maritime communications reduced section 353(b) of the Communications Act to being an occupational licensure provision that was increasingly unable to deliver rents to the faction that had secured its enactment. The FCC loosened its regulatory grip only when satellite technology had displaced radiotelegraphy. And Congress still has not removed from Title 47 of the U.S. Code this obscure regulation of an obsolete guild.
